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Abstract
These comments on the Draft Bill 2001, had been widely circulated in September 2001.
Discussions on the Bill have again revived in the media and elsewhere, as the reform of the
power sector has made little headway, and there is much concern that something needs to be
done. Little progress or changes have been made in the Bill, so that most of the comments made
then remain valid.
Essentially the Bill is maimed because it is not clear enough, does not lay a path for reform and
for the evolution of the sector, and in no way reduces the policy and regulatory uncertainties.
While it attempts to bring about open access, that objective would not be realised since cross
subsidies are to be loaded on to the transmission charge thereby killing whatever little prospect
there is the Bill for a market in power. There is no specification at all of the mode of
transmission pricing and the crucial role of transmission pricing is not recognised in the Bill.
The Bill does not recognise that cross-subsidies via differential prices would continue to keep
open the 'price-arbitrage' opportunity (the root of corruption and the source of all ills in the
system), so that no real change would be possible. The Bill gives legal status to far too many
'authorities' and bodies, some of them quite unnecessary and vestiges of the past. The
coordination problems between these are likely to take the system (if ever what is envisaged
materialises) far from the optimal. The special opportunity in inter-regional trade in power
cannot be realised unless the law limits the barriers to interregional trade. Most importantly the
Bill virtually rules out incentive regulation of the modern varieties such as price cap regulation.
Through the sub-clauses it brings in cost plus regulation. Cost plus regulation has been
particularly problematic in India, and can be expected to bring inefficiencies and cost padding if
not regulatory capture.Sebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
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These comments refer to particular sections and subsections as given in the references. The
comments follow the references. The references are in italics. Since there are many versions of
the Draft Bill that differ slightly the reference numbers may not match the sections correctly.
The references here refer to the version that was prior to the one put out on the Web by the
Government in September 2001.
Preamble 
Preamble should not say "development of the electricity industry as the industry.." as the
primary objective; or even consolidation of laws. Ideally, the preamble should have started
with the consumer interest; ie said "of ensuring that electricity industry develops in such a
manner as to serve the consumer interest". The rest of the preamble could then follow. The
point in a preamble is not to mention the processes or the modes for achieving a certain goal,
but the goal itself. Given that any law however well crafted would not be complete and would
have inconsistencies and contradictions it is important that the goal in simply and
unambiguously stated in the preamble. Similarly, that the Bill aims to serve the consumer
interest via a pluralistic industry structure and ownership, where therefore open access to the
network is crucial could be stated right at the beginning.
 
 Ref Part 1: Preliminary (short title, extent and comment) "provided that etc"..
This leaves very many different sequences of  commencement of the provisions. There are
certain constraints on the sequences. Thus one cannot have a market in transmission unless the
transmission charges are reasonable. If the charges are not so constrained, despite open access,
the market or even its rudiments may not materialise.
Part 1: Preliminary (Definition, 2)
 There is no commitment to notify within a reasonable of time. One of the major problems with
Indian law making is the gap between passage of a bill and its notification. Can a default date
say a year from the date of passage be the date after which the bill is deemed as having been
notified be inserted into the Bill itself?
 There are far too many bodies that are being envisaged. Even if there was clarity in their roles
(not there in the Bill as I will bring out later), these many agencies would most certainly lead to
confusion, high interface cost for the players (cos), and increase the probability of regulatory
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Also communication/coordination reguirements between these organisations increases more
than factorially so that confusion is almost certainly likely.
Many of the above organisations /authorities are not required at all. The Advisory Committees
can go, the Regional Power Authority is pointless, and the CEA's role can be more clearly
specificied so as to avoid overlap with other institutions. Equally importantly, the joint
responsibility between the CEA and the Regulator on many matters could lead to responsibility
shirking.
Ref to Preliminary/ Definitions, 2/(6) above dealing with appropriate government
The centre state jurisdiction is not based on any logic but on what exists in the existing laws
(which is contradictory), and on ownership.  Just by being central government owned need  not
make an entity come under the central govt and the central regulator. Similarly non-central
owned but having multiple state serving stations or stations in several stations (the very
purpose of open access and  interstate power movements) are problematic in the current state
of things and in this Bill. Ideally, the Central (regulatory agency, and government) should be
delineated not in terms of ownership or location but in term so function, such as interconnect,
interstate import export, constraints on transfer prices, on cross subsidies, constraint on the
regulatory mode etc. All others should be the state governments' /SERCs' purview. The earlier
amendments which allowed NTPC etc was itself faulty and inconsistent.  Thus the CERC
should not have tried to regulate the NTPC, but should have merely laid down the grid rules,
interconnect rules, and constraints on SERCs that would not have allowed them (the SERCs) to
rule/ work in such a way that interstate supply of power is at a disadvantage to intra-state
supplies. Actually the grid geometry and voltages should have been a logical starting point in
the demarcation of roles. The Central Regulator should have been concerned with access and
connect fees on connecting to the 400KV lines +DC lines and transmission charges in general.
 Ref: Ref to Preliminary/Definitions, 2/(9) "Captive Generation Plant"
There is an ambiguity in the definition of captive generation. An ex-ante definition is today
possible because of past policies that defined captive in a certain way. As captive is allowed
open access these definitions become ultra vires. Indeed, an ex-post definition of captive to
distinguish the same from generating units is hardly possible. The only difference then is the
amount of electricity sold versus that used within certain premises. That can vary enormously
and should so vary in a regime of time of use prices (TOU) and open access. So, an average
would have to be used. If that level so specified is breached then the plant could be considered
as 'generating plant'. Then what?
Ideally there is no need for the definition of such captive generation plants. The open access to
the grid can be defined in terms of minimum connected load/ supply  for companies whether
distributing, mixed cos, or pure generators.
Ref: Preliminary/Definitions, 2/Conservation  Item (15):  
This is an improper view of conservation.  Methods or processes that save energy by imposing
large capital and labour costs are not energy conservation. Correct, and meaningful
conservation is that which is also cost effective.  (Purely as an aside unlike what is commonly
believed, private Indian industry is far more energy intensive than Chinese or South East Asian
when the correct, structurally adjusted comparisons are made).
Ref: Preliminary/Definitions, 2/Conservation Item (16)
Do we not need to go beyond consumers to those who are presently excluded - or the
outsiders? Mention in the Bill of those who do not have access to electricity and the need for
them to be covered to ensure 'life-line' supplies is necessary. (A sentence to this effect may be
necessary even in the preamble). This will lead to the distinction between access subsidisation
and use subsidisation. In access subsidisation, the social benefits and "gains in terms of justice",
are enormous when those who are currently excluded are brought in.
 
Ref. Preliminary/Definitions, 2/ Item 32 /33 etc.Sebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
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There is the possibility of differences. The standards should be imposed by the regulator and
here the CERC, if there is to be a national grid. State commission and authority (ideally only the
authority) has only an advisory role.  Different codes have different implications for tradability
and grid management and the effectiveness of open access.
 
 Ref: Preliminary/Definitions, 2/Item (45):
National Electricity Plan:
There is no basis for  a plan in a decentralised model of the electricity system. In what way is
the "Plan" going to effect the decisions of the regulator and authority. What is the sanctity? If
the Demand projections go awry why should the consumer bear the high cost of such mistakes
of the planner?  The EPS (13, 14 etc) have become a joke. The Government (CEA on behalf of
the Govt) may still plan but purely for analytical reasons and for attempting to direct the sector
through subsidies and taxes in the direction it intends. The government should instead of
trying to incorporate "Planning" in the Bill (with the  intent to possibly constrain others who are
charged with the responsibility of ensuring the consumer interest -the regulator) encourage
competent bodies and persons (including the CEA) to come out with detailed forecasts, optimal
capacity addition trajectories, costs of alternate fuels, long term projections, general equilibrium
analysis of alternative policy scenarios, cost projections models, etc like the EIA of the DOE of
the US GOVT, which have an informative role.
 
 Ref: Preliminary/Definitions, 2/Item (56):
Regional Power Committees ? This is entirely adhoc. Why should government have this power
when it anyway has emergency powers? Throwing another layer or body does not ensure
regional coordination. Today the basis for regional coordination  is strong and the RLDCs are
good enough with better rules. All regional coordination should be through the RLDCs, and
the committees they may create. Since the interstate is in any case the Centre's domain it can,
through right powering the CERC and laying out in clear terms the grid rules, access, power
trade policy  and rules, ensure social optimality in the functioning of the RLDCs/ CTU.
 
1 of 1956: Ref. Part II/National Electricity Policies/National Electricity Policy:  Item 3(1)
If the government has to retain this power over tariff, then what sanctity is there to the tariff
determined by the regulator/s? The regulatory risk would continue to remain high and if
investments do come in that situation, then regulatory capture is inevitable.
 
 Ref: Part II/National Electricity Policy/Obligation to supply electricity to rural areas: Item (6)
"shall endeavor" is no commitment given the tendency of the state to say many things and do
many other (different) things. Thus, despite fifty years of public electricity development, there
are a large number of people (>30%) who are not covered by electricity. Many of these are
being denied (ie. They can afford electricity but do not have effective access) electricity.
So specification of time limit say by 2005 /2007 is necessary IN THE LAW, so that the courts
can pick up if the state fails (as is most likely). This is especially important as the state licenses
the production and sale of electricity. Alternatively it must not insist on a complete licensing of
electricity in India, but must make a special provision under which entirely unregulated
electricity (subject only to safety and criminal laws) be made possible. Only this will allow
electricity to reach those who are being currently denied : slum dwellers, the poor, and many in
areas with massive state failure.
Ref: Part III/Generation of Electricity/Generation Copanies and Requirement for Setting up of
Generating Stations: Item (7b):
In the printed version it is for information; In the text version I picked up from your office there
is no phrase "for information". "for information" is better and makes a crucial difference. The
point here is that the "information provision overload" on the players need to be reduced.
Unfortunately, this Bill will guarantee that the costs of information (not necessarily put to use)
gathering and filing would be high. It is necessary to mention that while the information
should go to all these agencies, a single format (that incorporates the concern of all theSebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
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agencies) would have to be used.  It will also bring about consistency between the data bases of
the various agencies. Today what SEBs report to the CEA is very different from what they do in
their annual statements!
"Provided that … coordinate with the Authority..". Why the Authority when the responsibility
is with the CERC/SERCs This would impose a large burden on not only the players but also on
the regulator. Of course for statistical and analytical pursposes CEA should have relevant data.
 Ref: Part III/Generation of Electricity/Hydro Electricity Generation/Item 8
This special right of the CEA on behalf of the government on hydro projects is I suppose
intended to bring in the 'eminent domain' of the state and 'the problem of riparian rights of
states'. The purpose or the intentions of public purpose from this special right in the law need
to be mentioned. This is more important than it seems. Thus despite the Power and the Water
Ministries having their expert bureaus close to each other, the use of water remains at best
sectorally optimal, not optimal across electricity use and agricultural use. There are
unimaginable allocative efficiencies here.
Ref: Part III/Generation of Electricity/Captive Generation/ 9(1):
Recall earlier comment about the definition of captive generator being problematic. Also it
would make sense to provide open access to all connecting load (and drawl) above a certain
size (5 MW).
 
Ref: Part IV/Licensing/Conditions of License/16(1)/
Here the Appellate process can be brought in.
Ref: Part IV/Licensing/17(i) Distribution Licensers not to do certain things 
With this important role of licensing, Commissions would have to have far greater skills and
sectoral and economic understanding of the problem, and far greater resources. Most
importantly they need the flexibility to pay differentially, to procure scare skills, and would
most certainly have to bust the salary ceilings proposed to be enshrined in the law!
Ref: Part IV/Licensing/Amendment of License/18
This is desirable but creates major risk. There ought to be a paragraph or a 'preamble' to say
what the expected direction of change is. The amount of "hedging" in this Bill is large and
needs to be reduced considerably. A policy paper  outlining the direction of change which
would be 'superior' to the law in the sense that the government would bring in amendments as
and when desired to achieve the purpose, or 'state of the sector' as in the policy paper would be
vital. That would also allow examination of the law and discussion on the same in parliament
and elsewhere more meaningful.
General comment: The commissions are being given a quasi judicial role (besides an expert
authority role), so right structuring the commission and right manning the same are most
crucial. Similarly, the processes to be undergone for appeal, and for public appeal needs to be
specified in the law.
 
Ref: Part IV/Licensing/Sale of Utilities of Licensee/20(1) 
The whole business of licensing can be separated from the costs/ performance etc by making
licensing only a technical condition, not a performance condition. With incentive regulation
(RPI-X type ) this separation is possible. The task of both licensing and tariff award with a view
to have the lowest cost for the consumer would prove an 'impossible' task for the regulator.
Even with all the skills and resources, the rule orientation (necessary) in regulatory offices and
the government  would heighten the probability of regulatory capture.
We would suggest that the mode of licensing, and the mode of regulation should be laid down
in this Bill. Only this would reduce the regulatory risk. As I will point out later, without saying
it in so many words, this Bill in effect pushed all regulators into detailed cost plus type ofSebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
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regulation, and I am convinced that this would make a fertiliser or oil refining industry out of
the electricity sector.
 
 Ref. Part V/Transmission of Electricity/Inter-State Transmission/National Low Despatch Centre/ Item
26 (1):
Why should the NLDC necessarily be a government company? Ideally the transmission co
should not be majority owned because of limitations on managerial freedom, that arise out of
government companies being 'state' in the eyes of the courts. Yet it should not be privately
owned.  Debarring the company form is unwise. You need the accounting discipline of the
company form. Right structuring would mean bringing in the consumer interest directly -
bodies of mfg industries, farmers groups, shop owners' associations etc on the board, as also
professionals unfettered by the limits with regard to pay and decision making powers of
managers of a government company.
The CTU/ STU's objective cannot be profit maximisation. Neither can it be profit maximisation
subject to certain constraints. An independent objective such as reduction in "variation of
computable nodal prices" could be the long term objective of the transmission company.
Ref: Part V/Transmission of Electricity/Inter-State Transmission/Function of Regional Low Despatch
Centre/28
The statements use here need to be elaborated in such a manner as to result in near TOU prices
for bulk power. This could be laid out by the commission but there is nothing in this Bill other
than the general appeal to economy and efficiency under which the Commissions can
introduce TOU prices.  Indeed the gains of  decentralised model over an uncoordinated
multiplayer model or even the regulated monopoly, emerge largely from TOU prices for bulk
power.
Ref: Part V/Transmission of Electricity/Inter-State Transmission/Functions of SLDC/32
Intra and inter state transmission cannot be so easily distinguished. Though contracts can be.
The reality is power flow which is arrived at through load flow solutions, which would
typically have nothing to do with all possible contracts or even desired contracts. It is necessary
to specify a model for the working (selection and rejection of contracts) based on load flow
/minimisation of total benefit (consumer +producer surplus) / nodal pricing etc that is
uniform for both intra and inter state and inter regional transmission. Different pricing and
systems of transmission would unnecessarily create barriers to trade across regions /states.
Externalities of contracts can be very large given transmission constraints. At the same time
that model or process for rejecting contracts ought to be communicated easily and
transparently to participants. The Bill should have made this clear, or indicate how the
Commission would do the same. The problem of transmission is complex enough to not allow
the cost plus models of regulation so far used, to be applied, in generation and trade.
 
Ref: Ref: Part V/Transmission of Electricity/Intra-State Transmission/Changes for Intervening/36(i)
This cannot be 'mutually agreed' in all situations. At a fee that covers the transmission entity's
cost of the intervening facility, availability to others must be ensured.
 
Ref: Part V/Transmission of Electricity/Inter-State Transmission/CTU audits function/ Item (c)/38(2)
Item (c) Should have precedence over the other items. (The objective of transmission in not
necessarily to reduce transmission cost to the minimum, but overall cost of delivered power to
the minimum, which may mean that while the transmission cost is a little over what is the
minimum the competition between generators could be considerably increased to result in
lower overall (wholesale) power  prices.
 Not only should generators and distributors be barred from holding / working transmission
assets and companies, but transmission entities should be debarred from having an interest in
any other business like generation and distribution.Sebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
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In the printed version, there is a section called "Other Business of the Transmission Licensee".
Therein there is 41(1) "A Transmission Licensee may with prior approval of the appropriate
commission engage in any business for optimum utlitisation of assets". The word any needs to
be replaced by "other than generation, distribution and activities related to the same (other than
transmission). It is necessary to specifically exclude interest (directly or indirectly ) in
businesses: fuel supply, generation, distribution, power trade, services related to these.  The
Section 41(4) would not be feasible under cost plus regulation which is what the Bill would
lead to (without explicitly so stating).
 
 
 Not just trading, but transmission should not be allowed into either generation or distribution.
 
Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Provisions with respect to distribution licenses/Duties of Distribution
Licensee.43 (2)
It is very unwise to build cross subsidy on distribution charge. As argued before the 'least
worst' way to build cross subsidy would be on total cost or final sale price. In any case
distribution costs are notoriously difficult to vouch for and with cross subsidisation there
would be an 'invitation for fraud'.
This way to recover the cross subsidisation would be disastrous for the market even in the
intervening period.  With multiple players (even ignoring for the moment the issue of the
agency problem (Morris, 1999)), the only way cross subsidisation can be fair to all players is to
charge uniform prices including duties (or taxes) to all consumers, and then, to redistribute the
part of the duties plus the subsidy + subvention from the government as rebate (subsidy) to the
subsidised consumers. The Orissa model inter alia failed because this was not done.
The other way is to impose a duty on all generators ad valorem which is collected and given to
distribution companies to subsidise certain customers.
But even these above ignore the massive agency problem or "the invitation to fraud" that it
creates in distribution companies.
If on transmission even a small part of the cross subsidy is loaded, then the market for power
vanishes. It is akin to a turnover tax that is the surest way of killing markets. Power trade
would not be possible then except in a very limited way perhaps.
The Bill could have laid out a  scheme and a time frame for right subsidisation and limiting
cross subsidies instead of leaving them open.  Besides the agency problem, the price and
regulatory risk would continue to be very high.
Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Provisions with respect to distribution licenses/Poer to recover
charges/46
 This section virtually rules out RPI-X, rPI-x-r, or any incentive regulation altogether without so
saying. Why is this being done? Had the Bill explicitly specified a relevant price index based
regulation the regulatory risk would have fallen considerably. More importantly the task of
regulation would have been feasible and the probability of regulatory capture minimal.
The least the Bill could have done is to have allowed the choice to the regulator.
 
 
Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Provisions with respect to distribution licenses/Other Businesse of
Distribution/52
Except transmission. This is necessary so that perverse incentives to mismanage transmission is
not there.
This is not fair to the other business, and entirely unnecessary if incentive regulation is used.
 
 Sebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
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Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Provisions with respect to distribution licenses/Centre restrictions on
Electricity Trades 54
 




Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Provisions with respect to supply/Use of meters, etc./Growth 56(1)(2)
Why two years?
" by the Authority:"
Better to leave the type of meters etc to Distribution Entities, subject to accuracy certification of
model/make by Authority and  checks by regulator. Stiff fines for inaccurate meters
(overspeeded) by Distribution entities, imposed by the regulator would be advisable.
(2)…. Electricity, the Authority may direct…
Authority should have little to do except the technical veracity. The type of meters, or even the
need for them should be driven by the Transmission company, grid rules, and the Commission
for regulatory countercheck. The need for open access with TOU prices would necessarily
impose certain minimum features for such meters.
 This whole discussion presumes that theft is a problem external to the SEBs. This is entirely
false. No 'theft' is possible without the active connivance and involvement of the SEB staff and
officers. Ignores that the underlying basis of the problem is the price (and duty) arbitrage
opportunity in electricity sales.
Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Consumer Potection, Standards of Pefformance of Distribution
Licensees/58(1) and (2)
There is a need to prescribe the basis for such standards.
Ninety days is too long a period.
Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Consumer Potection, Standards of Pefformance /Different Standards
of Performance by Licensee/59
Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Consumer Potection/Standards of Pefformance of Distribution
Licensees/Information with respect to levels of performance/60
Not only such information but a case by case gathering is necessary. Also there is a need to pre-
specify standard modes of measurement of electricity quality.
Instead of once a year etc, it is necessary to state that the form of the information provided to
the public/ publication needs to be sufficient in detail and meaningful in presentation so as to
promote the consumer interest, and involve the consumer in utility performance and
regulation. Indeed, being a regulated industry, it is almost axiomatic that all data (except such
items as are deemed to be private for commercial operation) would be available to the
consumer. In cost plus regulation practically all data would have to be available to the public.
In incentive regulation the cost data can be legitimately kept private till the regulatory term
/period is over.
Ref: Part VI/Supply of Electricity/Consumer Potection/Standards of Pefformance of Distribution
Licensees/Market Domination/61
 
Part VII/Tariff/Tariff Regulation/62 
Why should 62(a) be as such? In that  case if the CERC can so influence the SERCs why not
impose incentive regulation to greatly reduce regulatory risk and cost?
"lowest sustainable price of electricity" needs to be explicitly mentioned.Sebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
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This is contrary to the cost plus principle being expounded elsewhere. Can the state regulator
use this clause to override possible inappropriate regulatory approaches of the Central
Commission.
(g) and (h) NRE, and subsidies are clearly aspects of government policy and should not be
loaded onto the Commissions.
As mentioned before can be dealt with by differential duties in a 'least worst' manner.
Part VII/Tariff/Determination of Tariff/62
To what purpose? Even cost plus could be better by being standard cost plus or industry
average. Cost blow up like in the fertiliser industry is almost certain, when the cost plus is on
individual plant.
This clearly rules out RPI-X type regulation.  The US type mess pre-deregulation is likely.
Tariffs would go up dramatically all round.
Unwarranted supervision and monitoring problem. Can any Commission ever have this
information, truly? Possible only if the Commission has access to the billing data, and can
conduct independent verification.
'do'/Procedures for Tariff Rules/64(2) and (3); 64 (2) and (3)
This again rules out RPI-X type of regulation.
120 days is not sufficient for full scrutiny. Gaming is most likely.
-End of Paper-
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